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THE FLSA AND THE NCAA’S POTENTIAL 
TERRIBLE, HORRIBLE, NO GOOD, VERY BAD 
DAY 
Sam C. Ehrlich 
The NCAA is at a crossroads with student-athlete compensation.  Over 
the past few decades, the NCAA and its partners have faced lawsuits from 
several different angles with essentially one consistent argument:  Student-
athletes deserve to be compensated for what they provide to colleges and 
universities. 
In two such lawsuits—Dawson v. NCAA and Livers v. NCAA—the 
plaintiffs have attempted a new strategy:  arguing that revenue sport student-
athletes are employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).  These 
cases have gained some traction, and the distinctive protections granted to 
employees under the FLSA present unique challenges worth exploring.  
This Article analyzes the potential results of a plaintiff victory in a 
FLSA case on the landscape of collegiate sports.  To that end, this Article 
explores the unique benefits and challenges the FLSA presents, and how in-
tercollegiate sports would be shifted by a plaintiff victory on this front. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
  Sam C. Ehrlich, J.D., Doctoral Student, Sport Management, Florida State University.  The 
author would like to thank John T. Holden and Ryan M. Rodenberg for their continuing guidance 
and support.  This Article has not been prepared, approved, or licensed by any person or entity that 
created or produced the children’s book by Judith Viorst or any entity involved with that book or 
any other works based on it.  This Article is not associated with, or sponsored or approved by, any 
such other person or entity.  The body text of this Comment is intended to be current as of October 
2018.  However, there have been some updates to the cases discussed herein prior to publication.  
These updates are discussed in limited fashion within the footnotes. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) is at a cross-
roads with student-athlete compensation.  In the past few decades, the NCAA 
and its partners have faced court cases from a variety of different angles and 
legal theories all with essentially one argument:  Student-athletes deserve to 
be compensated for the value they provide to the NCAA and its member 
colleges and universities.1  As college sports continue to grow and produce 
more revenue for those with the means to exploit it, the call to give student-
athletes their fair share has only intensified.2 
Although attempts in court to force change in college athletics have 
been slow, they have had some positive effects.  In O’Bannon v. NCAA, stu-
dent-athlete plaintiffs initially won increased scholarship compensation to 
the tune of the full cost of attendance as well as a $5,000 per year stipend.3  
The Ninth Circuit, however, took that stipend back on appeal.4  More re-
cently, In re NCAA Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation (and its companion 
cases Jenkins v. NCAA and Alston v. NCAA), an antitrust challenge to the 
NCAA’s caps on compensation that comprise the lynchpin of its amateurism 
rules that keep student-athletes from receiving compensation beyond schol-
arships survived a motion for summary judgment and is slated for trial in late 
2018.5  These cases are notable due to their attempt to “attack[] the NCAA’s 
                                                          
1.  Such claims have ranged, for example, from the NCAA’s licensing of student-athlete 
names and likenesses in video games; Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name 
& Likeness Licensing Litig.), 72 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 
(3d Cir. 2013); Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2013); O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 
F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015); to caps on compensation allowable in athletic scholarships (Agnew v. 
NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012)); and the rights of student-athletes to pursue endorsement 
deals (Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. App. 2004)).  
2. See, e.g., Allen R. Sanderson & John J. Siegfried, The Case for Paying College Athletes, 
29 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 115, 116 (2015). See generally Andrew Steckler, Time to Pay College Ath-
letes? Why the O’Bannon Decision Makes Pay-for-Play Ripe for Mediation, 17 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 1071 (2015); Caroline Kane, The NCAA Is Dropping the Ball: Refining the 
Rights of Student-Athletes, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 171 (2015).  
3. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1049; O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014).  
See Nicholas Kitko, The Law May Cave, But Economics Will Not: The Road to Paying Student 
Athletes is Longer Than We Think, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 319, 335 (2017).  
4. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1049.  
5. Eleanor Tyler, Know Your Judge: Claudia Wilken Putting NCAA Amateur Rules to a 
Jury, BLOOMBERG LAW (July 13, 2018), https://biglawbusiness.com/know-your-judge-claudia-
wilken-putting-ncaa-amateur-rules-to-a-jury/ [https://perma.cc/4EHV-PDY7]; Michael McCann, 
NCAA Amateurism to Go Back Under Courtroom Spotlight in Jenkins Trial, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED 
EHRLICH_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2019  12:30 PM 
2019] THE FLSA AND THE NCAA’S POTENTIAL BAD DAY 79 
cap on [its] grant-in-aid itself, rather than merely the association’s re-
strictions on sharing [National Letter of Intent] revenue.”6 
Beyond Jenkins, however, there are at least two additional challenges 
to NCAA amateurism restrictions based on the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”), a federal law granting employees both minimum wage and over-
time protections.7  These cases—Dawson v. NCAA and Livers v. NCAA—are 
still in their early stages and have several flaws in their pleadings that may 
inhibit their ability to effect change on a major scale.8  However, in at least 
one of these cases, the court has shown a willingness to entertain the idea 
that student-athletes are employees under the FLSA’s exceedingly broad def-
inition of that term.9 
In many ways, the plaintiffs’ actions in the FLSA suits mirror the at-
tempts by minor league baseball players to use federal employment law to 
circumvent the longstanding exemption from antitrust scrutiny in Major 
League Baseball (“MLB”).10  Like the MLB, the NCAA has shown remark-
able resilience against the Sherman Antitrust Act.11  To date, amateurism 
rules have survived despite serving to depress salaries of top collegiate ath-
letes to bare minimums, even in light of record-shattering revenues in college 
                                                          
(Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.si.com/college-football/2018/04/02/ncaa-amateurism-trial-judge-
wilken-martin-jenkins-scholarships [perma.cc/DS2W-3M3H].  
6. In re NCAA Ath. Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 14-md-02541-CW, 2018 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 52230, at *24 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2018).  
7. See Dawson v. NCAA, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401 (2017); Livers v. NCAA, No. 17-4271, 2018 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124780 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 2018).  See also Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 290 
(7th Cir. 2016) (finding that non-scholarship track-and-field athletes were not employees under the 
FLSA but provoking a concurrence where one judge theorized that he was “less confident” that the 
holding would extend to “so-called revenue sports like Division I men’s basketball and FBS foot-
ball.”).  
8. See infra Part II.C.  
9. See Livers, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124780, at *17 (“[T]his Court cannot at this stage say 
that Plaintiff was not an FLSA employee as a matter of law during his football career as a Scholar-
ship Athlete at Villanova.”)  
10. See Sam C. Ehrlich, Minor Leagues, Major Effects: What if Senne Wins?, 6 MISS. 
SPORTS L. REV. 23, 23–24 (2016).  
11. See Thomas A. Baker III, Marc Edelman & Nicholas Watanabe, Debunking the NCAA’s 
Myth that Amateurism Conforms with Antitrust Law: A Legal and Statistical Analysis, 85 TENN. L. 
REV. 4, 4 (publication forthcoming) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3072641 
[https://perma.cc/AK9X-Z6KU].  
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football and college basketball.12  Just as the Senne v. Office of the Commis-
sioner of Baseball suit threatened to force change to minor league baseball 
by judicial decree even without the protection of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 
Dawson and Livers threaten to serve as an alternate path to paying student-
athletes should the antitrust challenges to amateurism fail to accomplish such 
dramatic changes.13 
As with minor league baseball players, it remains to be seen whether 
antitrust is the best avenue to challenge amateurism restrictions on student-
athlete compensation.  Since Jenkins was filed in 2014, legal scholars have 
assessed its merits through a variety of different legal lenses, coming to var-
ious conclusions about how the case will fare at the district court and even-
tually the Ninth Circuit on appeal.14  Even in a best-case scenario for student-
athletes, however, Jenkins will only serve to increase compensation beyond 
the cost-of-attendance, perhaps giving student-athletes a small stipend to 
help pay for expenses beyond tuition and housing.  A win on FLSA grounds, 
on the other hand, would seemingly assure college athletes minimum wage 
and time-and-a-half for any time worked over forty hours.15 
                                                          
12. Id.  
13. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1049.  In Senne, a group of current and former minor league 
baseball players have challenged MLB’s set payment scheme for minor league players—which in 
some cases pay players as little as $3,000 per year—by claiming that these wages are below the 
minimum wage afforded by federal law.  Ehrlich, supra note 10, at 24.  While Senne is currently 
being litigated at the time of publication, its potential to affect future change has been legislated 
away by Congress through the “Save America’s Pastime Act,” a change to the FLSA buried within 
a 2,232-page omnibus bill passed in March 2018 that specifically exempted minor league players 
from FLSA application.  See Nathaniel Grow, The Save America’s Pastime Act: Special-Interest 
Legislation Epitomized, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (forthcoming 2019) https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3169957 [http://perma.cc/BE27-7YDF].  
14. See generally, David J. Berri, Paying NCAA Athletes, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 479 
(2016); William W. Berry III, Employee-Athletes, Antitrust, and the Future of College Sports, 28 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 245 (2017); Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in O’Bannon v. 
National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for College-Athlete Rights, and a 
Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319 (2014); Marc Edelman, How 
Antitrust Law Could Reform College Football: Section 1 of the Sherman Act and the Hope for 
Tangible Change, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 809 (2015); and William B. Gould IV, Glenn M. Wong 
& Eric Weitz, Full Court Press: Northwestern University, a New Challenge to the NCAA, 35 LOY. 
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1 (2014).  
15. See generally Minimum Wage, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/minimumwage.htm [https://perma.cc/R6YJ-WSNS]; Doug Hass, “Half-
Time” Overtime: The Fair Labor Standards Act’s Fluctuating Workweek Method, INSTITUTE FOR 
APPLIED MANAGEMENT & LAW (Apr. 17, 2015), https://iaml.com/blog/half-time-overtime-fair-la-
bor-standards-acts-fluctuating-workweek-method [http://perma.cc/7CJF-DUX9]. 
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But even beyond the benefits of minimum wage and overtime protec-
tions, unlike in the minor league baseball case where minor league baseball 
players are indisputably employees of their respective teams, the use of the 
FLSA in Dawson and Livers has significant power beyond what antitrust 
cases can offer simply by the threat of a court deciding that student-athletes 
are indeed “employees” for the purposes of federal employment law.  The 
word “employee” has significant power in federal law.  A ruling granting 
student-athletes these rights would give them a variety of legal protections 
within the employment and labor law spheres that could potentially spiral 
and either completely change the nature of college athletics or threaten its 
very existence. 
This Article seeks to explore the scope and potential effects of a court 
ruling in favor of student-athlete employment under the FLSA on a variety 
of different legal facts and issues.  Part II provides background to the Daw-
son and Livers cases and analyzes the plaintiffs’ chances of success in each 
suit.  Part III explores the potential effects of a victory by either plaintiff—
or a victory in a future FLSA case that overcomes the weaknesses inherent 
in Dawson and Livers’ respective cases—by analyzing the scope of such a 
victory in terms of the sports and schools affected, the ripple effects that 
create protections, and the various challenges presented through other fed-
eral employment law statutes.  Lastly, Part IV analyzes the possibility that a 
FLSA victory could open the door to unionization previously closed by the 
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”).16  Part IV also theorizes that, 
should these lawsuits gain momentum, unionization by student-athletes may 
actually be the saving grace for the NCAA moving forward.17 
II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF DAWSON AND LIVERS 
A.  Precursor to Dawson and Livers: Berger 
The first foray by college athletes into the world of FLSA claims was 
by Gillian Berger and Taylor Hennig, two former track-and-field stars at the 
University of Pennsylvania (“Penn”).18  In their complaint, the plaintiffs 
                                                          
16. See Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n (CAPA), 362 N.L.R.B. 167 (N.L.R.B. 
Aug. 17, 2015).  See also infra Part III.  
17. Id.  
18. Complaint, Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 162 F. Supp. 3d 845 (S.D. Ind.), 
aff’d, 843 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2016). Student-athletes’ rights under the FLSA has been debated 
within the sports law scholarship in the form of a student-note published in 2017. Geoffrey J. 
Rosenthal, College Play and the FLSA: Why Student-Athletes Should Be Classified as “Employees” 
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sought to receive class-action status to sue not only Penn, but also the NCAA 
and all 123 NCAA Division I member schools.19  In doing so, Berger and 
Hennig claimed that “[a]ll current and former NCAA Division I student ath-
letes, on women’s and men’s sports rosters” legally functioned as employees 
within the contexts of the work provided to their respective schools.20  Berger 
and Henning compared the role of student-athletes to work-study students 
who are considered employees under the FLSA and other federal and state 
employment statutes.21  The two argued that student-athletes, who “perform 
longer, more rigorous hours” and “are subject to stricter, more exacting su-
pervision by full-time staff of NCAA Division I Member Schools,” meet the 
                                                          
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 35 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133, 136 (2017).  Some college 
athletes had previously attempted to gain legal employment status in the early 1980s for student-
athletes through state workers’ compensation laws with little success.  See Coleman v. W. Mich. 
Univ., 125 Mich. App. 35 (1983), leave to appeal denied, 418 Mich. 872 (1983) (finding that a 
football student-athlete is not an employee within the meaning of Michigan’s Worker’s Disability 
Compensation Act because football was not an integral part of the university’s business); Rensing 
v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1172 (Ind. 1983) (finding that a football student-
athlete was not an employee of his university because there was no intent by the university to enter 
into an employment contract with the student); Graczyk v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 184 Cal. 
App. 3d 997 (1986) (affirming the California worker’s compensation board’s ruling that a college 
football player at Cal State Fullerton was not an employee of the university).  See generally Shaun 
Loughlin, Workers’ Compensation and Student-Athletes: Protecting the Unpaid Talent in the 
Profit-Making Enterprise of Collegiate Athletics, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1737 (2016). Another novel—
but unsuccessful—claim in this area involved a student-athlete who attempted to argue for personal 
immunity as an employee of his (public) university.  Korellas v. Ohio State Univ., 779 N.E.2d 
1112, 1113 (Ct. Cl. 2002).  Finally, student-athletes at Northwestern University attempted to gain 
employment status through labor law and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) through a 
petition to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for unionization rights that was declined 
by the NLRB on jurisdictional grounds. Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n (CAPA), supra 
note 16.  See also infra Part IV. 
19. Berger Complaint, supra note 18, at 1–10.  The original complaint included Samantha 
Sakos, a former soccer player at the University of Houston, as the lead plaintiff.  Id.  However, 
Sakos was later replaced by Berger and Hennig due to the fact that Sakos attended a public school. 
Steve Berkowitz, Judge Dismisses NCAA Wage Lawsuit Involving Penn Track Athletes, USA 
TODAY (Feb. 16, 2016, 10:03 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/col-
lege/2016/02/16/ncaa-wage-hours-lawsuit-samantha-sackos-penn-track-fair-labor-standards-
act/80482630/ [http://perma.cc/KA4H-2T98]. As discussed later in this Article, many public 
schools—including the University of Houston, a public school in Texas—may be exempt from 
FLSA claims due to sovereign immunity. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 812 (1999) (holding 
that states are immune from FLSA claims under the Eleventh Amendment unless the state legisla-
ture specifically waives that immunity).  
20. Berger v. NCAA, 162 F. Supp. 3d 845, 847 (S.D. Ind.), aff’d, 843 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 
2016).  
21. Berger Complaint, supra note 18, at 10 (emphasis omitted).  
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FLSA’s employment criteria “as much as, if not more than, work study par-
ticipants.”22 
Berger and Henning’s attempt to claim employment status for student-
athletes under the FLSA did not go well.  In February 2016, the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana dismissed the FLSA 
claims in their entirety without leave to amend, ruling that student-athletes 
cannot be considered employees of their respective schools.23  About ten 
months later, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision on 
the basis that “student-athletic ‘play’ is not ‘work,’ at least as the term is used 
in the FLSA.”24 
In dismissing Berger and Hennig’s claims, both the District Court and 
the Seventh Circuit relied heavily on the “economic reality” test.25  This test 
allowed the courts to reject the traditional multifactor tests generally used to 
determine employment status, and instead permitted them to not only look 
at the economic reality of the situation, but also what the plaintiffs should be 
expecting based on the relationship between the parties.26  Specifically, the 
                                                          
22. Id.  
23. Berger, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 857.  The claims against the more than 120 other NCAA 
schools and the NCAA were dismissed out of hand on standing grounds, as the court ruled that the 
plaintiffs’ “connection to the other schools and the NCAA is far too tenuous to be considered an 
employment relationship.”  Berger, 843 F.3d at 289.  
24. Berger, 843 F.3d at 293.  
25. Id. at 290.  See Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Because status 
as an ‘employee’ for purposes of the FLSA depends on the totality of circumstances rather than on 
any technical label, courts must examine the ‘economic reality’ of the working relationship.”); 
Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 32–33 (1961) (rejecting the use of any com-
mon law tests to determine whether the plaintiffs were employees, as “[t]here is no reason in logic 
why [the plaintiffs] may not be employees” and that “if the ‘economic reality’ rather than ‘technical 
concepts’ is to be the test of employment, [the plaintiffs] are employees); Brock v. Mr. W Fire-
works, 814 F.2d 1042, 1042 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that factor tests are only relevant to the deter-
mination of FLSA employment status “to the extent that they mirror ‘economic reality’”); Karr v. 
Strong Detective Agency, Inc., Div, of Kane Servs., 787 F.2d 1205, 1207 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating 
that the main purpose of FLSA employment tests is “on the ‘economic reality’ of the situation).  
26. The “economic reality” test stands in contrast to other common law tests that courts 
have created to delineate employment status under the FLSA in various circumstances.  See e.g., 
United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 715 (1947) (defining the first five-factor test for determining 
employment status under the FLSA); Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 
1 (Cal. 2018) (defining the “ABC” test as used in California to classify workers as employees or 
independent contractors under the FLSA and California’s wage orders); Sec’y of Labor, United 
States Dep’t of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1535 (7th Cir. 1987) (defining six factors for 
determining whether a migrant worker is an employee under the FLSA); Glatt v. Fox Searchlight 
Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 534–535 (2d Cir. 2015) (defining a six part test for determining 
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courts found that there exists a “tradition of amateurism in college sports” 
that governs the relationship between universities and student-athletes.27  
The various multifactor tests proposed by the plaintiffs “simply [did] not take 
into account this tradition of amateurism or the reality of the student-athlete 
experience.”28  This confirmed the court’s holding that student-athletes can-
not be considered employees under the FLSA and that no facts existed to 
show that such a relationship exists.29 
While the Berger plaintiffs may have lost both in the District Court and 
in the Seventh Circuit, the concurring opinion by Judge Hamilton has, in 
some ways, opened the door for future FLSA claims against the NCAA and 
member schools.  In this concurrence, Judge Hamilton noted that as student-
athletes at an Ivy League university, Berger and Hennig did not receive ath-
letic scholarships from the university due to the Ivy League’s longstanding 
ban on athletic scholarships.30  According to Judge Hamilton, this severely 
hurt Berger and Hennig’s appeal to overturn the court’s longstanding protec-
tions for NCAA student-athlete amateurism rules.31  Even more troubling for 
Berger and Hennig was that their claims seemed to be an imperfect case for 
student-athlete employment from the very start.  As Judge Hamilton noted, 
the plaintiffs were track-and-field athletes, which “is not a ‘revenue’ sport at 
Penn or any other school” for that matter.32 
While Judge Hamilton believed that Berger and Hennig’s claims were 
“mistaken” for the aforementioned reasons, he stated that he was “less con-
fident” that a similar decision would “extend to students who receive athletic 
scholarships to participate in so-called revenue sports such as Division I 
                                                          
whether an intern is an employee under the FLSA). See also Donovan v. Dialamerica Mktg., Inc., 
757 F.2d 1376, 1382 (3rd Cir. 1985) (adopting a six-factor test to determine employee status under 
the FLSA).  
27. Berger, 843 F.3d at 291 (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 
U.S. 85, 120 (1984)).  
28. Id.  
29. Id. at 294.  
30. Id. (Hamilton, J., concurring).  See also Prospective Athlete Information, THE IVY 
LEAGUE (July 7, 2017), https://ivyleague.com/sports/2017/7/28/information-psa-index.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/Z2YD-H8L7].  
31. Berger, 843 F.3d at 294.  
32. Id.  
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men’s basketball and Football Bowl Subdivision [“FBS”] football,” as 
“[t]hose sports involve billions of dollars of revenue for colleges and univer-
sities.”33  In those cases, Judge Hamilton believed that the “economic reality 
and the tradition of amateurism may not point in the same direction” and thus 
“there may be room for further debate, perhaps with a developed factual rec-
ord rather than bare pleadings, for cases addressing employment status for a 
variety of purposes.”34  Judge Hamilton’s concurrence became a guiding 
light for future plaintiffs seeking employment status for their participation in 
college athletics, including the plaintiffs in Dawson and Livers—the two 
cases discussed in this Comment. 
B. Dawson and Livers:  What Has Happened So Far? 
1.  Dawson v. NCAA 
As Berger made its way through the courts, former collegiate football 
player Lamar Dawson filed his own FLSA lawsuit claiming that his status as 
a Division I football player at the University of Southern California (“USC”) 
created an employment relationship with the NCAA and the Pacific 12 Con-
ference (“Pac-12”).35  Notably, however, Dawson did not include USC 
within the complaint, despite the fact that the court in Berger found that the 
plaintiffs’ “connection to the other schools and the NCAA [was] far too ten-
uous to be considered an employment relationship.”36  Instead, Dawson ar-
gued that the Pac-12 and the NCAA were both his employers under the 
FLSA’s joint employment doctrine,37 basing this argument on language in 
the Pac-12’s handbook stating that the conference was organized “[t]o pro-
vide its members with a jointly governed body for sponsoring, supervising 
and regulating intercollegiate athletics as a conference member of the 
                                                          
33. Id.  
34. Id.  
35. Complaint, Dawson v. NCAA, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, No. 3:2016-CV-05487 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 26, 2016).  
36. Id.; Berger, 843 F.3d at 289.  
37. 29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (1958).  See Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 190 (1973) (finding a 
joint employment situation between an apartment management company and the building owners 
for the apartment building maintenance workers).  
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[NCAA] in accordance with the principles, policies, constitution and bylaws 
of the NCAA.”38 
Despite this unique argument, Dawson’s case was dismissed by the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California in April 
2017.39  As in Berger, the court rejected the idea of using a multifactor test 
to examine whether the relationship between the NCAA and football players 
constituted an employment relationship.40  Here, the court found Berger’s 
reasoning to be persuasive enough to show that the economic reality of the 
relationship between the student-athlete and the university is not indicative 
of an employment relationship.41  The court’s decision was not supported by 
Judge Hamilton’s concurrence, which was believed to be not persuasive 
enough to overrule the majority’s reasoning of the case.42  Ultimately, the 
court rejected Dawson’s argument that Division I football’s status as a reve-
nue generator distinguished his case from Berger, citing several cases to 
prove that revenue generation was not enough to determine employment sta-
tus.43 
At the time this Article was being composed, Dawson appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit, with oral arguments scheduled for October 15, 2018.44  On 
                                                          
38. Dawson Complaint, supra note 35, at 7.  See Pac-12 Conference, Pac-12 2016-17 
Handbook 6 (Aug. 20, 2016), http://championships.pac-12.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/2016-
17-P12-Handbook.v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FQ6-CJPB].  The reason for USC’s omission is un-
known (the issue is not addressed in any of plaintiff’s filings), and it was not corrected prior to the 
court’s rendered decision.  As a private school, USC would not be held under sovereign immunity.  
One conceivable explanation for USC’s absence from the claim is that Dawson did not want to 
harm his alma mater and instead wanted only to go after the governing conference and the NCAA.  
Regardless of the reason, USC’s absence from the case is a major deficiency with Dawson’s claim 
that will likely harm his chances at the Ninth Circuit, though a narrow decision that merely dis-
misses the claim on standing grounds could mitigate the damage for future plaintiffs with similar 
claims.  See infra Part III.C.  
39. Dawson v. NCAA, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 409 (N.D. Cal. 2017).  
40. Id. 
41. Id.  
42. Id. at 406.  
43. Id. at 407.  See Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th 
Cir. 1983); Jochim v. Jean Madeline Educ. Ctr. of Cosmetology, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 3d 750, 759 
(E.D. Pa. 2015); Townsend v. California, 191 Cal. App. 3d 1530, 1532 (1987).  
44. See Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Dawson v. NCAA, No. 17-15973 (9th Cir. 
2018); Notice of Oral Arg., Dawson v. NCAA, No. 17-15973 (9th Cir. Aug. 5, 2018) (No. 43). Oral 
arguments were in fact held on October 15, 2018, with the judges focusing the vast majority of the 
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appeal, Dawson, in part, has argued that the District Court erred by not 
properly considering the “striking breadth” of the FLSA’s definition of “em-
ployee,”45 and the purportedly even broader scope of the definition of the 
term under California employment law which allows statutory wage and 
hour provisions “to be liberally construed with an eye to promoting such 
protection [of employees].”46  Dawson also argued extensively that the Dis-
trict Court did not give proper weight to Judge Hamilton’s concurrence in 
Berger, claiming that Hamilton’s concurrence “makes it abundantly clear 
that, far from requiring dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, the “nature of the 
relationship” test favored by the majority in Berger actually supports a de-
termination that Division I FBS football players are employees.”47  The latter 
argument would be echoed on the other side of the country in Livers but 
ultimately treated far differently by the Pennsylvania District Court. 
2. Livers v. NCAA 
Lawrence “Poppy” Livers was a football player for Villanova Univer-
sity (“Villanova”), an NCAA Division 1-AA institution in the Colonial Ath-
letic Association (“CAA”).48  Similar to Dawson, Berger, and Hennig before 
him, Livers sued Villanova, the NCAA, and all other universities within the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, claiming that his 
work as a football player for Villanova constituted employment.49  Like 
                                                          
discussion on the joint employer issue and whether the NCAA and Pac-12 conference could in fact 
be held to be Dawson’s employer, rather than on whether Dawson was a legal employee under the 
FLSA. See Oral Argument, Dawson v. NCAA, No. 17-15973 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 2018), 
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000014440.  See also Sam C. Ehr-
lich (@samcehrlich), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2018, 4:16 PM), https://twitter.com/samcehrlich/sta-
tus/1051929780009009153 (narrating and commenting on the Dawson oral arguments in real-
time.)  
45. Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Dawson, No. 17-15973 at 15 (quoting Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992)).  
46. Id. at 38 (quoting Indus. Welfare Comm’n v. Super. Ct. of Kern Cty., 27 Cal. 3d 690, 
702 (1980)).  
47. Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Dawson, No. 17-15973 at 25 (emphasis omitted).  
48. Livers v. NCAA, No. 17-4271, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83655, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 
2018).  
49. Id.  Livers’ lawsuit gained some unexpected notoriety during the pleading stage of the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss, as some members of the online press picked up on the NCAA’s use 
of Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1992), a case where prisoners unsuccessfully 
argued that their work for their respective prisons constituted employment, as “evidence” that the 
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Dawson (and unlike Berger), Livers argued that his circumstances consti-
tuted a joint employment situation with both Villanova and the NCAA to-
gether serving as his employers under the FLSA.50 
Citing both Berger and Dawson as persuasive authority, the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania originally dis-
missed Livers’ claim for a variety of reasons, including a failure to meet the 
statute of limitations.51  On the FLSA claim, however, the court took a some-
what different approach than both the Seventh Circuit and the District Court 
for the Northern District of California.  Whereas in Berger and Dawson, the 
courts declined to use a multifactor test to determine employment status 
based on the economic reality test, the Pennsylvania District Court noted that 
the Third Circuit has, in some circumstances, “involved a multi[]factor test 
to evaluate the economic realities of employment relationships for the pur-
pose of determining FLSA rights.”52  The court noted that Livers did not 
                                                          
NCAA was comparing student-athletes to prisoners.  See e.g., Shaun King, The NCAA Says Stu-
dent-Athletes Shouldn’t Be Paid Because the 13th Amendment Allows Unpaid Prison Labor, THE 
INTERCEPT (Feb. 22, 2018, 11:33 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/02/22/ncaa-student-athletes-
unpaid-prison/ [https://perma.cc/H5CZ-6EWC]; Elie Mystal, NCAA Doubles Down On Comparing 
Student Athletes To Prisoners, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 23, 2018, 1:01 PM), 
https://abovethelaw.com/2018/02/ncaa-doubles-down-on-comparing-student-athletes-to-prison-
ers/ [https://perma.cc/BJ6B-UBJ3]; Kevin Gannon, Black Labor, White Profits, and How the NCAA 
Weaponized the Thirteenth Amendment, THE TATTOOED PROFESSOR (Feb. 23, 2018), 
http://www.thetattooedprof.com/2018/02/23/black-labor-white-profits-and-how-the-ncaa-
weaponized-the-thirteenth-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/MYS7-LYCG].  This notoriety was 
likely prompted in part by the move by Livers’ attorneys to file for sanctions against the NCAA for 
relying on the Vanskike case, allegedly in violation against the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition 
against involuntary servitude and narrow exemption for prison labor. Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanc-
tions, Livers v. NCAA, No. 2:17-cv-04217, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83655, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 
29, 2018).  Predictably, this motion was denied by the court, as the court recognized that the NCAA 
and member schools’ use of Vanskike was merely to demonstrate the economic reality test, not to 
compare NCAA student-athletes to prisoners.  See supra note 25 and accompanying text.  
50. 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a).  See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.  
51. Livers, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83655, at *25–30.  The statute of limitations for FLSA 
claims is two years for inadvertent violations and three years for “willful” violations.  Id. at *21–
22.  Based on when he completed his career as a student-athlete at Villanova, Livers’ claim was 
filed right in the middle of these two rules, meaning that he had to show that the NCAA and other 
defendants’ violation of the FLSA regarding his claim was “willful,” meaning that they “knew or 
showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the FLSA.”  Id. 
at *25–26 (quoting Brock v. Richland Shoe Co., 799 F.2d 80, 81 (3d Cir. 1986)).  While it was 
clear from the start that Livers’ claim of a willful FLSA violation was weak, he was able to conquer 
this deficiency with his complaint by adding a new plaintiff in early 2019.  See infra note 69.  
52. Id. at *38.  See Donovan v. Dialamerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1382 (3rd Cir. 
1985) (adopting a six-factor test to determine employee status under the FLSA).  
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assert enough facts in his complaint to overcome this burden, and accord-
ingly dismissed the complaint against Villanova and the NCAA without prej-
udice, which allowed Livers to submit an amended complaint that focused 
more narrowly on the Donovan factors.53 
After Livers filed his amended complaint to address the court’s con-
cerns, the NCAA once again moved to dismiss on similar grounds.54  This 
time, however, the court denied the NCAA’s motion to dismiss, finding that, 
based on the facts and legal theories added to the pleadings by Livers, the 
court “[could not] at this stage say that [the] plaintiff was not an FLSA em-
ployee as a matter of law during his football career as a Scholarship Athlete 
at Villanova.”55  While the court was still hesitant to give Livers a full victory 
due to the problems with meeting the statute of limitations, the court found 
that the “additional facts regarding the economic reality of the relationship 
between [the] [p]laintiff, in his capacity as a Scholarship Athlete with the 
Villanova football team, and Villanova and the NCAA” were enough to al-
low the claim to proceed to limited discovery.56  Notably, the court explicitly 
declined to follow the prior rulings in Berger and Dawson, determining that 
those cases “are not controlling,” and even if they were, they “proceed on 
slightly different facts and theories” than those brought in Livers.57 
C.  Can the Plaintiffs Win? 
By declining to dismiss Livers’ claim, the District Court has opened a 
narrow path to a successful FLSA claim by student-athletes against the 
                                                          
53. Livers, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83655, at *47–50.  The claims against the other schools 
within the Third Circuit’s jurisdiction were dismissed with prejudice, as the court ruled that the 
plaintiff did not have standing to sue schools that he did not attend.  Id. at *30–37.  However, in a 
departure from Berger, the court allowed the claim against the NCAA to be dismissed without 
prejudice with Villanova, finding that there may be a claim against the NCAA under a joint em-
ployment theory as the NCAA exerted “significant control” over the plaintiff.  Id. at *33–35.  See 
also In re. Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 469 (3d Cir. 
2012) (identifying four factors to evaluate an alleged employer-employee relationship in the joint 
employment context).  
54. See Amended Complaint, Livers v. NCAA, No. 2:17-cv-04271-MMB (E.D. Pa. May 
30, 2018); Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, Livers v. NCAA, No. 2:17-cv-04271 (E.D. Pa. 
June 13, 2018).  
55. Livers, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124780, at *17.  
56. Id. at *16–18.  
57. Id. at *17 n.3.  
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NCAA where student-athletes are considered employees of their respective 
universities.  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit could conceivably overrule the Dis-
trict Court’s decision in Dawson, though given the same court’s actions to 
substantially alleviate an athlete-favorable District Court decision in favor of 
the NCAA amateurism rules in O’Bannon, such a ruling is perhaps un-
likely.58 
At the same time, however, both Dawson and Livers have significant 
flaws in their individual claims that will likely, if not undoubtedly, impede a 
plaintiff’s ability to cause a change to the current amateurism model.  For 
example, Dawson, even in the best-case scenario, suffers from a standing 
issue, since the plaintiff inexplicably failed to include USC, the entity that 
would be his most direct “employer” should a court decide he was an em-
ployee of anyone, in his suit.59  For this same reason, the NCAA and the 
other universities were dismissed from Berger before the Seventh Circuit 
even took on the FLSA issues because the FLSA merely allows employees 
to allege claims that are “only traceable to, and redressable by, those who 
employed them.”60 
On the other hand, Livers will likely fail despite the clear progress made 
in the amended complaint, due to the plaintiff’s failure to file prior to the 
expiration of the two-year statute of limitations for inadvertent violations of 
                                                          
58. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1076 (9th Cir. 2015).  See Matthew J. Mitten, Why 
and How the Supreme Court Should Have Decided O’Bannon v. NCAA, 62 ANTITRUST BULL. 62, 
62 (2017) (discussing the uncertainty that the Supreme Court created by refusing to grant certiorari 
in O’Bannon to clear up inconsistent application of NCAA v. Board of Regents).  
59. See Dawson Complaint, supra note 35.  Indeed, the plaintiff of the parallel suit, Livers, 
did include his school in his claim and alleged that his school functioned as a joint employer with 
the NCAA, and for that reason was successful at keeping the NCAA in his claim.  Livers, 2018 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124780, at *15–17.  See supra note 38 and accompanying text.  
60. Berger, 843 F.3d at 289 (quoting Roman v. Guapos III, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 407, 412 
(D. Md. 2013)).  While Dawson’s claim involving only the regulatory agencies involved with col-
lege sports (i.e. the conference and NCAA) is certainly novel and stands as a way to distinguish his 
claim against the NCAA from Berger, his inexplicable failure to include USC as one of the joint 
employers will likely stand in his way at the Ninth Circuit, as of all of the potential employers of 
Dawson, USC was the entity with the most direct control over Dawson’s activities even if they 
were hamstrung and directed by NCAA and Pac-12 rules and regulations.  Indeed, at oral argument 
the Ninth Circuit judges focused most of their questioning on the viability of the joint employment 
claim and focused very little on the actual question of whether student-athletes are actually FLSA 
employees.  See supra note 44.  
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the FLSA.61  In its initial motion to dismiss, the NCAA argued that by not 
paying student-athletes, it was following the guidelines of the United States 
Department of Labor Field Operations Handbook (“FOH”), which states, in 
relevant part: 
As part of their overall educational program, public or private 
schools and institutions of higher learning may permit or require 
students to engage in activities in connection with dramatics, stu-
dent publications, glee clubs, bands, choirs, debating teams, radio 
stations, intramural and interscholastic athletics and other similar 
endeavors. Activities of students in such programs, conducted pri-
marily for the benefit of the participants as a part of the educa-
tional opportunities provided to the students by the school or in-
stitution, are not work of the kind contemplated by section 3(g) of 
the Act and do not result in an employer-employee relationship 
between the student and the school or institution.62 
These guidelines—which were also cited by the Berger63 and Dawson64 
courts as persuasive to their shared conclusion that student-athletes are not 
employees—were accepted by the Livers court as persuasive evidence that 
the NCAA and its member institutions “acted reasonably in making the judg-
ment that they need not compensate student athletes pursuant to the FLSA” 
and therefore “did not willfully violate the FLSA,” which would allow for a 
                                                          
61. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.  As mentioned earlier, Livers was ultimately 
able to conquer this deficiency by adding a new plaintiff to the claim in early 2019.  See infra note 
69.  
62. Livers, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83655, at *27–28; Field Operations Handbook § 
10b03(e), UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (Mar. 31, 2016), 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/FOH/FOH_Ch10.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5DW-VURR] The FOH was 
first written in 1993 as “an operations manual that provides Wage and Hour Division (WHD) in-
vestigators and staff with interpretations of statutory provisions, procedures for conducting inves-
tigations, and general administrative guidance.” Wage and Hour Division, Field Operations Hand-
book (FOH), UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (Aug. 31, 2017), 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/foh/ [https://perma.cc/U2QZ-6CU8] As the Seventh Circuit noted in 
Berger, the FOH guidelines “are not dispositive, but they certainly are persuasive.”  Berger, 843 
F.3d at 292.   
63. Berger, 843 F.3d at 292–293; Berger, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 856–57.  
64. Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 406–07.  
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more generous three-year statute of limitations.65  While the court allowed 
Livers to refile with “facts plausibly establishing willfulness” by the NCAA 
and Villanova to violate the FLSA, the court was clear that this would be an 
extremely difficult hurdle for the plaintiff to overcome, as he would be re-
quired to “address the FOH guidelines and allege either facts or cite law to 
support the conclusion that Defendants willfully violated the FLSA despite 
reliance on the FOH guidance” to be successful on their second attempt.66  
The court refused to grant the NCAA’s motion to dismiss the amended com-
plaint as it was not totally convinced by the plaintiff’s new arguments re-
garding the willfulness element.67  The court stated that while the amended 
complaint “include[d] sufficient additional factual allegations to state a plau-
sible willful FLSA violation,” it would only allow for sixty days of targeted 
abbreviated discovery “limited to the issue of willfulness.”68  This, therefore, 
required the plaintiff to show the willfulness element before full discovery 
would be warranted.69 
                                                          
65. Livers, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83655, at *28–30.  
66. Id. at *30.  
67. Livers, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124780, at *13, *17.  In the amended complaint Livers 
argued mainly that the full extent of the NCAA and Villanova’s reliance on the FOH guidelines 
was a question of fact that could not be resolved at the motion to dismiss stage and that the similarity 
between scholarship football players and work-study students—who are considered employees by 
the FOH—suggested a “reckless disregard of the alleged duty” by the NCAA and Villanova to pay 
student-athletes a minimum wage.  Id. at *8–13.  Specifically, Livers argued that “over the course 
of the decade-plus public debate” over student-athlete pay, the NCAA nor any college administra-
tors had never “professed reliance on Section 10b03(e) as one such justification” not to pay student-
athletes.  Id. at *12.  The court found those arguments persuasive, stating that Livers’ allegations 
to this effect created “a plausible inference that Defendants did not rely on the FOH guidance in 
making” the decision not to pay student-athletes, and that “at the Motion to Dismiss stage it remains 
an open fact question what impact, if any, the FOH guidance had on Defendants’ thought process 
and reasoning behind the decision not to pay [Livers] and other student athletes.”  Id. at *12–13.  
68. Id.  
69. Id.  As the body text of this Article is only current as of October 2018, the author would 
like to note that the statute of limitations issue in Livers was resolved in November 2018 when the 
court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to substitute and join Taurus Phillips as the new named plaintiff 
in the suit and denied a new motion to dismiss by the NCAA.  Pretrial Order at 1–2, Livers v. 
NCAA, No. 2:17-cv-04271, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83655 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 27, 2018) (granting Liv-
ers’ motion to substitute and join Taurus Phillips as a party plaintiff and ordering the parties to “to 
discuss merits discovery now that the statute of limitations issue is no longer in the case”) (empha-
sis added).  Phillips also played at Villanova but graduated in 2018, thereby making his claim well 
within the standard two-year statute of limitations for non-willful FLSA violations. Plaintiff’s Mo-
tion to Proceed Based Upon the Joined Claim of Taurus Phillips at 3, Livers v. NCAA, No. 2:17-
cv-04271, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83655 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2018).  As such, in January 2019 the 
court ordered the parties to engage in limited discovery on “the threshold issue of whether Plaintiff 
EHRLICH_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2019  12:30 PM 
2019] THE FLSA AND THE NCAA’S POTENTIAL BAD DAY 93 
Further, the general idea of an FLSA claim by a student-athlete against 
the NCAA and member universities has problems that mitigate the potential 
of the overall impact of such a case on the amateurism scheme.  Both Daw-
son and Livers—and presumably any future claims alleging that the NCAA 
has committed FLSA violations—are forced to rely heavily on Judge Ham-
ilton’s concurrence in Berger, which, while academically interesting, poten-
tially persuasive, and extremely helpful to the conceptualization of a revenue 
sport athlete’s claim, is merely dicta and certainly cannot be considered bind-
ing in any respect.70  Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, Judge Hamilton never 
concretely stated that he believed that revenue sport student-athletes could 
maintain a solid claim against the NCAA.71  Instead, he merely stated that he 
would be “less confident” that the Seventh Circuit’s line of reasoning would 
extend to football and men’s basketball players.72  In fact, the District Court 
in Dawson considered Judge Hamilton’s separate opinion in its analysis, but 
found that the divergence was simply made “in passing” and “did not purport 
to represent an alternative line of legal analysis,” noting that the Seventh 
Circuit denied an en banc rehearing in Berger.73 
Recent history has shown that courts are wary about overturning any 
portion of NCAA rules by judicial decree.74  Perhaps most famously, after 
                                                          
is an ‘employee’” under the FLSA as to either or both of Villanova and the NCAA, with the first 
dispositive motions on this issue due by June 14, 2019.  Scheduling Order at 1-2, Livers v. NCAA, 
No. 2:17-cv-04271, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83655 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2019).  
70. Berger, 843 F.3d at 294.  
71. Id. 
72. Id.  
73. Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 401, 406.  The Livers district court decision did not mention 
Judge Hamilton’s concurrence, likely because the concurrence was inexplicably never mentioned 
in Livers’ complaint or brief in opposition to the defendants’ initial motion to dismiss.  See Livers, 
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83655; Complaint, Livers v. NCAA, No. 2:2017-CV-04271, 2018 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 83655 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2017); Plaintiff’s Memo. In Oppo. To Def.’s Motion to 
Dismiss, Livers v. NCAA, No. 2:17-cv-04271, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83655 (E.D. Pa. 2018).  The 
amended complaint did not attempt to cure this deficiency.  See Livers Amended Complaint, supra 
note 54.  
74. Various courts have declined to overturn the NCAA’s amateurism regulations in a va-
riety of different topic areas.  See, e.g., Justice v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 577 F. Supp. 356 
(D. Ariz. 1983) (declaring that the NCAA’s general use of regulatory authority to issue amateurism 
rules and issue sanctions for violations is not a violation of antitrust law); Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992); (upholding that the NCAA’s regulations disqualify-
ing student-athletes that hire agents or enter the draft); Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. App. 
2004) (upholding the NCAA’s regulations disqualifying student-athletes that receive endorsement 
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the District Court for the Northern District of California enjoined the NCAA 
from preventing student-athletes from collecting the full cost of attendance, 
plus an additional $5,000 stipend, as part of their athletic scholarships in 
O’Bannon,75 the Ninth Circuit, on appeal, removed the $5,000 stipend from 
that decision, stating that “[t]he difference between offering student-athletes 
education-related compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to 
educational expenses is not minor; it is a quantum leap.”76  Given the Ninth 
Circuit’s statement in O’Bannon concerning the “quantum leap” between 
educational expenses and payment, it seems difficult to imagine that the 
court would make such a dynamic change to the model of collegiate sports 
through a judicial opinion to allow for dramatically increased student-athlete 
pay, let alone to legally classify them as “employees” as would be required 
to afford them FLSA protection. 
Nevertheless, there is still a chance that a student-athlete’s FLSA claim 
could prove successful in a future case—if not in Dawson or Livers.  The 
decision in Livers to dismiss the original complaint without prejudice, for 
example, provided the plaintiff a roadmap to bring a claim worthy of surviv-
ing a motion to dismiss by basing such a claim on the employment test 
adopted by the Third Circuit in Donovan.77  The Donovan test features six 
factors: 
(1) the degree of the alleged employer’s right to control the man-
ner in which the work is to be performed; 
(2) the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depend-
ing upon his managerial skill; 
                                                          
deals); Deppe v. NCAA, 893 F.3d 498 (7th Cir. 2018) (upholding the NCAA’s “year-in-residence” 
rule that requires student-athletes to sit out a year after transferring schools).  But see Oliver v. 
NCAA, 920 N.E.2d 203 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2009) (finding that the NCAA rule punishing a college base-
ball player for retaining an attorney while weighing a professional offer was arbitrary and a viola-
tion of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing).  
75. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014).  
76. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d 1049 at 1078–79, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016).  
77. Livers, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83655, at *38–40; Donovan, 757 F.2d at 1382 (adopting 
a six-factor test to determine employee status under the FLSA).  Several jurisdictions have differing 
tests for distinguishing between employers and independent contractors; Donovan functions as the 
Third Circuit’s test.  See Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-573, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61230 
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2018) (noting that Donovan is the “seminal case in this Circuit for determining 
whether a worker is an employee under the FLSA.”).  
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(3) the alleged employee’s investment in equipment or materials 
required for his task, or his employment of helpers; 
(4) whether the service rendered requires a special skill; 
(5) the degree of permanence of the working relationship; 
(6) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged 
employer’s business.78 
As the Eastern District of Pennsylvania noted in Livers, the Donovan 
test was adopted primarily to distinguish between employees and independ-
ent contractors.79  However, the court has also found cases that have applied 
the Donovan test to “the question of whether particular workers who receive 
monetary compensation for their work, under varying conditions and cir-
cumstances, are in fact “employees” entitled to FLSA coverage.”80  At the 
same time, the court found that based on the original complaint, one of the 
more important facets to this application—the need for the workers to “re-
ceive monetary compensation for their work”—was not applicable here, 
since academic and athletic scholarships do not count as “compensation” un-
der the FLSA.81 
                                                          
78. Livers, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83655, at *38–39 (citing Donovan, 757 F.2d at 1382).  
79. Id. at *38–40.  
80. Id. at *39 (emphasis omitted).  
81. Id. at *6.  Here, the court’s finding that scholarships were not compensation for athletic 
work was based partially on the fact that they were “not taxable income as applied to qualified 
education expenses required for enrollment and attendance.”  Id.  See Letter from John A. 
Kroskinen, Office of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Serv., to Richard Burr, Senator, 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (Apr. 9, 2014) (https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/14-0016.pdf) 
[https://perma.cc/W86Y-WP25] (ruling that qualified athletic scholarships from gross income as 
“the athletic scholarship awarded by the university is primarily to aid the recipients in pursuing 
their studies” and is thus excludable under § 177 of the IRS Code).  See also Justin Morehouse, 
When Play Becomes Work: Are College Athletes Employees?, TAX ANALYSTS (Apr. 3, 2015), 
http://www.taxhistory.org/www/features.nsf/Articles/0473CF3877C2DB9C85257E1B004D63C5 
[https://perma.cc/93TU-HSXB] (discussing the tax status of athletic scholarships in light of the 
since-overturned NLRB regional board decision ruling that Northwestern University football stu-
dent-athletes are employees under the NLRA.) If student-athletes receive compensation beyond 
“tuition, fees, books, supplies, and equipment required for enrollment and attendance for courses,” 
however, these scholarships could lose their qualified tax-exempt status, potentially opening the 
doors to a change in the calculus on this element. Id.; Kathryn Kisska-Schulze & Adam Epstein, 
Northwestern, O’Bannon and the Future: Cultivating a New Era for Taxing Qualified Scholar-
ships, 49 AKRON L. REV. 771, 773–74 (2016); Marc Edelman, From Student-Athletes to Employee-
Athletes: Why a Pay for Play Model of College Sports Would Not Necessarily Make Educational 
Scholarships Taxable, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (2017) (debating whether deeming student-ath-
letes employees would convert the scholarship ‘compensation’ they receive into taxable income).  
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Nonetheless, the Livers court left a window open for Livers to jump 
through.  Citing Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor,82 
the court told Livers that in the amended complaint he would have to show 
that he and other student-athletes “relied on the benefits” of their scholarship 
and scholarship funds “to the same extent as the workers in Tony & Susan 
Alamo Foundation, who were ‘entirely dependent upon the Foundation for 
long periods’” for their livelihood.83  The court stated that this would show 
“an ‘economic reality,’ which the Supreme Court held reflected an employ-
ment relationship.”84  Demonstrating such a level of dependence should not 
be difficult; in fact, a number of both legal and non-legal scholars have al-
ready done so in academic articles.85  For example, in a 2006 article, Profes-
sors McCormick and McCormick discussed student-athletes’ economic de-
pendence on their universities within the context of the common law test for 
the term “employee,” arguing that student-athletes’ “primary requirements 
for survival—food and shelter—are met by their university-employers 
through grants-in-aid” scholarships, and that interviews and secondary 
sources show that “many athletes come from impoverished or humble back-
grounds and cannot afford school, food, or lodging without the grant-in-
aid.”86  As such, student-athletes would be dependent on their scholarships 
to provide them access to higher education—or even food and housing—in 
                                                          
82. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).  
83. Id. at 293.  
84. Id.  
85. See, e.g., Ray Yasser, Are Scholarship Athletes at Big-Time Programs Really Univer-
sity Employees? You Bet They Are!, 9 THE BLACK L.J. (UCLA) 65, 77 (1984); Billy Hawkins, The 
Black Student Athlete: The Colonized Black Body, 1 J. OF AFRICAN AMER. MEN 23 (1995); Jason 
Gurdus, Protection Off of the Playing Field: Student Athletes Should Be Considered University 
Employees for Purposes of Workers’ Compensation, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907, 916 (2000); Justin 
C. Vine, Leveling the Playing Field: Student Athletes Are Employees of Their University, 12 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 235 (2013).  
86. Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: 
The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 117 (2006).  See Irvin Muchnick, Welcome 
to Plantation Football, LA TIMES (Aug. 31, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/aug/31/maga-
zine/tm-athletes35 [https://perma.cc/WSW6-VQ7J] (discussing interviews with student-athletes 
about their financial situations while in school and the hardships they face in trying to pay for 
necessities like rent, utilities, and medical care as a result of NCAA restrictions).  
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similar fashion to the dependence of the employees in Tony & Susan Alamo 
Foundation.87 
McCormick and McCormick further argue that it is even easier to show 
that student-athletes are dependent on their schools since “NCAA rules for-
bid players from accepting cash or other gifts from non-family members, and 
even gifts from family and guardians are limited to an amount which, when 
combined with any grant-in-aid, covers only the cost of attendance.”88  While 
the authors note that the NCAA allows student-athletes to take outside em-
ployment while in school—a change from prior NCAA policy that prohib-
ited student-athletes from taking employment in all cases—employment can-
not be based on “the publicity, reputation, fame or personal following that 
he or she has obtained because of athletics ability.”89 
To this point, Livers did include in his amended complaint some further 
information about his alleged dependence on Villanova and the NCAA, cit-
ing a Delaware County Daily Times article about him, which described his 
inability to stay in school or find a place to eat until he was able to gain a 
scholarship from the Villanova football team.90  In spite of the statute of lim-
itations issue, the court found this additional information to satisfy the Tony 
& Susan Alamo Foundation test, ruling that Livers adequately showed “his 
personal economic dependence on his scholarship while attending Villa-
nova.”91 
Even if Livers himself cannot take advantage of this decision due to an 
inability to prove the willfulness needed to overcome his ostensibly late fil-
ing,92 the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s decision to refuse to dismiss the 
NCAA’s motion to dismiss has in turn provided a clear roadmap for future 
                                                          
87. Id.; 471 U.S. 290, 293 (1985).  See supra notes 82–84. 
88. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 86, at 118.  See generally, NAT’L COLLEGIATE 
ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2017-2018 NCAA Division I Manual, Art. 16.11 (Effective August 1, 2017), 
http://image.cdnllnwnl.xosnetwork.com/attach-
ments1/files/11600/628372.pdf?DB_OEM_ID=11600 [https://perma.cc/SQ8J-Z5CK].  
89. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 86, at 118; 2017-2018 NCAA Division I Man-
ual, supra note 88, at Art. 12.4.1.1.  
90. Livers Amended Complaint, supra note 54; Terry Toohey, Livers Took Long Way to 
the Field at Villanova, DEL. CTY. DAILY TIMES (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.delcotimes.com/arti-
cle/DC/20131010/SPORTS/131019920 [https://perma.cc/S5AP-PTMC]. 
91. Livers, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124780, at *6.  
92. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.  
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plaintiffs in front of the same court to get a favorable ruling in support of a 
FLSA claim to employment by their respective universities.  According to 
the court, a football student-athlete plaintiff who is within the statute of lim-
itations can find success by adapting the six Donovan factors to the economic 
reality of big-money college athletes, including showing that the student-
athlete is economically dependent on his or her athletic scholarship.93  While 
another judge (or the Third Circuit) may not agree with that particular 
judge’s reading of the issue, the Livers decision still provides some measure 
of a chance for a future plaintiff down the road.  Similarly, if Dawson were 
to receive a narrow ruling at the Ninth Circuit that affirmed the dismissal of 
his claims, based on both standing and the absence of USC within the 
claim—but reversed the lower court’s absolute statement that “there is 
simply no legal basis for finding [Division I FBS college football players] to 
be ‘employees’ under the FLSA”—such a ruling could also open the door 
for future claims by other plaintiffs.94 
Furthermore, it is conceivable that the efforts of Dawson and Livers to 
show that revenue sport student-athletes are employees could get a boost 
through a plaintiff victory in the corresponding antitrust cases, including In 
re NCAA Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation.95  As mentioned, a principal 
reason why the court in Livers found that student-athletes are not employees 
was the fact that grant-in-aid scholarships cannot count as compensation un-
der the FLSA, which the court found necessary to show an employment re-
lationship.96  The antitrust cases could change the calculus on this element, 
as a plaintiff victory in this case could open the doors to schools giving stu-
dents grant-in-aid compensation beyond the cost of attendance.97  The Livers 
decision was primarily based on the lack of taxable income received by these 
students, but as commentators analyzing the tax implications of paying stu-
dent-athletes have noted, the tax code limits the tax exemption for qualified 
                                                          
93. Livers, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83655, at *39; Livers, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124780, 
at *5.  
94. Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 408.  
95. See In re NCAA Ath. Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 14-md-02541-CW, 2018 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52230, *23 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2018).  See also supra note 5 and accompanying 
text.  
96. Livers, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83655, at *6.  See supra note 81.  
97. In re NCAA Ath. Grant In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52230, at 
*19.  
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scholarships to just “tuition, fees, books, supplies, and equipment required 
for enrollment and attendance for courses.”98 
While this has no bearing on Livers himself, as Livers did not and will 
not play in this hypothetical environment, the Livers precedent finding that 
student-athletes can conceivably find relief under the FLSA could have a 
strong bearing on future student-athletes.99  To this end, a ruling in the anti-
trust cases that allows for colleges and universities to pay student-athletes 
beyond these elements could lead a future court relying on Livers to decide 
that a future plaintiff who receives grant-in-aid beyond qualified expenses 
does receive compensation from his or her “employer” and thus is an em-
ployee under the FLSA. 
While it seems unlikely that Dawson and Livers will be able to advance 
their individual claims, it is possible that future plaintiffs who learn from 
these two cases could have a strong chance of prevailing in the near future.  
As such, the effects of such a decision must be considered to determine how 
collegiate athletics—and the NCAA itself—would be affected by the con-
version of student-athletes to legal employees under federal law. 
III. THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF A DAWSON OR LIVERS VICTORY 
A. The Possible Circuit Split Between Berger and Dawson/Livers 
The first major effect of a victory by a “revenue sport” athlete like 
Dawson or Livers can be inferred from the circuit split created by Daw-
son/Livers and Berger.100  Both Dawson and Livers are outside of the Sev-
enth Circuit—Dawson is in the Ninth Circuit while Livers is in Third Cir-
cuit—therefore, if Dawson or Livers were to win, there would be conflicting 
precedent.  Dawson and Livers would declare that some student-athletes are 
employees, while Berger would state that other student-athletes are not. 
                                                          
98. Morehouse, supra note 81.  See also Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 81.  But see 
Edelman, supra note 81, at 1161–63 (arguing that it is possible to keep the qualified status of ath-
letic scholarships even in a “pay for play” environment for student-athletes.)  
99. See Livers, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124780, at *17.  
100. See Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 294 (7th Cir. 2016) (Hamilton, J., concurring).  
While the specific deficiencies in the Dawson and Livers cases are certainly acknowledged, this 
Article refers to a hypothetical winning FLSA claim by a Division I football or men’s basketball 
player in line with Judge Hamilton’s concurrence as “Dawson” or “Livers,” despite the fact that 
Dawson and Livers are somewhat unlikely to prevail in their own individual claims.  
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Barring resolution by the Supreme Court, the resulting circuit split 
could be resolved by the courts in one of three ways.101  First, future courts 
may go by the “earliest-decided rule,” leaving Berger as controlling law.102  
Second, future courts interpreting these decisions could simply interpret the 
rulings along circuit jurisdictional lines, where student-athletes within the 
Ninth Circuit or within the Third Circuit’s jurisdiction would legally be em-
ployees, while student-athletes in the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction would 
not be considered employees.103 
Each of the first two options seem unlikely, however, as a third panel 
hearing a FLSA case involving student-athletes would likely be able to rec-
oncile the previous cases and place the new case alongside either Berger or 
the winning case based on the significant differences between Berger and 
either Dawson or Livers.104  Presumably, a decision in Dawson or Livers 
would rely at least in part on the vast revenue differences between the plain-
tiffs in the three cases in finding a way to distinguish Berger.105  Division I 
                                                          
101. See Michael Duvall, Resolving Intra-Circuit Splits in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
2008 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2008), http://www.fclr.org/articles/html/2008/fedctslrev1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EDZ4-CBCB].  
102. Id. at 3–4.  
103. Geographic Boundaries, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/u.s._federal_courts_circuit_map_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RRM-S4WJ].  
104. Duvall, supra note 101, at 3.  
105. Judge Hamilton’s concurrence in Berger may be the guiding light in this regard, 
though it is important to remember that the Livers court—which was the most receptive to a FLSA 
claim by a student-athlete—did not rely on Judge Hamilton’s concurrence in deciding to give Liv-
ers a second chance to file a worthy complaint.  See supra note 73.  Since Berger was decided, 
however, the use of revenue-generation as a determinative factor for employment status appears to 
be disfavored, specifically by the Dawson court.  The Dawson court specifically noted that revenue-
generation is not a sole determining factor of employment status, citing Bonnette v. Cal. Health & 
Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983), where the Ninth Circuit declined to apply a 
different standard to public social service agencies than the standard applied to profit-seeking em-
ployers.  Dawson v. NCAA, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 407 (N.D. Cal. 2017).  However, the Ninth 
Circuit in Bonnette found that the public social service agency was an employer despite the lack of 
profit- or revenue-generation capacity in comparison to “profit-seeking employers.”  Bonnette, 704 
F.2d at 1470.  In line with how the Ninth Circuit cited Bonnette—to show that revenue-generation 
has little bearing on a determination of whether someone is acting as an employee—the preceden-
tial split between Berger and Dawson/Livers would likely be based more on the four factors prof-
fered by Bonnette—power to hire and fire, levels of supervision and control, control over the rate 
and method of pay, and the maintenance of employment records—rather than which sports make 
more money.  Id.  If this is the case, then college baseball would likely be included with basketball 
and football, as these programs exhibit a much higher level of control over student-athletes than 
non-scholarship track-and-field programs like that at Penn in Berger.  
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football players (and possibly men’s basketball players, depending on how 
the decision is written) would be considered employees, while non-scholar-
ship track-and-field student-athletes would not. 
These vast differences would not necessarily help courts in other cases 
however, as the precedent created would be extremely wide, making it diffi-
cult to determine where other sports are placed on that spectrum.  For exam-
ple, while most college baseball programs are still falling short of making a 
profit, the sport has come into its own as a revenue-generator for athletic 
departments, especially in the Southeastern Conference (“SEC”).106  If other 
programs and conferences follow the “SEC Blueprint” and continue to grow 
college baseball, would college baseball be considered closer to football than 
to track-and-field?107  The plaintiff classes in the ongoing college athletics 
antitrust lawsuits include women’s basketball players—would women’s bas-
ketball student-athletes have to be included, therefore, with their male col-
leagues as employees under Title IX or the Equal Pay Act?108  Furthermore, 
                                                          
106. See generally Frank P. Jozsa Jr., College Baseball Economics, SEAMHEADS (July 18, 
2012), http://seamheads.com/blog/2012/07/18/college-baseball-economics/ [perma.cc/JN5R-
JH7X]; Michael L. Owens, When It Comes to College Sports Revenue, Even A Powerhouse Like 
UVa Can’t Compete, THE DAILY PROGRESS (June 6, 2014), https://www.dailypro-
gress.com/news/local/when-it-comes-to-college-sports-revenue-even-a-powerhouse/arti-
cle_29eb808c-edd8-11e3-9f88-0017a43b2370.html [https://perma.cc/3KTU-R9WA]; Laurie Gal-
lagher, Following the SEC Baseball Blueprint to a Third Revenue Sport, COLLEGE AD (Feb. 4, 
2016), http://collegead.com/following-the-sec-baseball-blueprint-to-a-third-revenue-sport/ 
[https://perma.cc/3W2M-TGF7].  
107. Jozsa, supra note 106.  The likely answer is yes, assuming that employment status 
would be determinative on the nature of the student-athletes’ work, the level of control that univer-
sities have over the student-athletes, and the student-athletes’ reliance on scholarships rather than 
pure revenue-generation.  See supra note 105.  
108. See, e.g., Jenkins v. NCAA (In re NCAA Ath. Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.), No. 
14-md-2541 CW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103703 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2016).  The question of 
whether female student-athletes would have to be considered employees alongside their male coun-
terparts is a complicated question that deserves its own study.  On one hand, the Supreme Court 
has afforded Title IX “a sweep as broad as its language” and has subsequently applied its effect to 
employees at educational institutions, leading to the possibility that a court could determine that 
calling male student-athletes statutory employees while calling female student-athletes in the same 
sport simply students could constitute discrimination under Title IX.  N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. 
Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982).  See also Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 175 
(2005) (“‘Discrimination’ is a term that covers a wide range of intentional unequal treatment; by 
using such a broad term, Congress gave the statute a broad reach.”).  On the other hand, the Equal 
Pay Act—an amendment to the FLSA—only applies to employees, and revenue generating student-
athletes (largely men) could be considered an entirely different class under these statutes than the 
student-athletes who are left as simply student-athletes; after all if the goal of the Equal Pay Act is 
“equal pay for equal work” and men’s basketball players are generating a profit for their schools 
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there is a huge difference between Dawson and Livers:  Livers, the case 
seemingly closest to a plaintiff victory, involves a Division I-AA school (Vil-
lanova) rather than a major “blue blood” institution like USC.109  This further 
complicates matters; if Division I-AA football programs do not receive 
nearly the same revenue as Division I-A programs, that opens the door to 
many more programs due to the much lower comparative revenues of Divi-
sion I-AA programs like Villanova.110 
Ultimately, if a court were to find student-athletes to be employees, that 
court would have to be careful to delineate which student-athletes are em-
ployees and which are not.  Otherwise, it will be difficult for future courts—
and athletic departments—to determine where exactly the line is.  Regard-
less, if such a ruling were to occur, it would likely take years of litigation—
or substantial compromise by the NCAA of its governing ethics—to deter-
mine the true scope of the FLSA’s impact on college sports. 
B. Which Universities Would Be Covered?  The Private vs. Public 
University Distinction 
It is notable that Berger, Dawson, and Livers all have one important 
similarity:  All three suits involve student-athletes who played at private 
schools—Penn, USC, and Villanova, respectively.111  This similarity is likely 
not coincidence nor accident, as the FLSA has particular quirks in terms of 
the public/private distinction in colleges and universities.  While according 
to the Department of Labor (“DOL”), public employers are generally held to 
the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime requirements,112 the Supreme 
Court in Alden v. Maine ruled that under the Eleventh Amendment, state 
                                                          
while women’s basketball players are not, a court could interpret this as unequal work.  See gener-
ally Cty. of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).  Regardless, this legal issue is one where 
speculation is difficult—if not impossible.  
109. See Ben Kercheval, Numbers Show Revenue Gap Between FBS and FCS Widening, 
COLLEGE FOOTBALL TALK (June 16, 2011, 8:00 AM), https://collegefootball-
talk.nbcsports.com/2011/06/16/ncaa-numbers-reveal-widening-financial-gap-in-d1/ 
[http://perma.cc/VV5B-RLPE].  
110. Id.  
111. As discussed earlier, the original plaintiff in Berger was a student-athlete at a public 
school who had to be replaced by Berger and Hennig as a result.  See supra note 19.  
112. Wage and Hour Division, FACT SHEET #7: STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS UNDER 
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA), U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR (2011), 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs7.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY5L-PB6Q].  
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colleges and universities are generally immune to FLSA suits under the prin-
ciples of sovereign immunity unless the states specifically waive that im-
munity via statute.113 
Private universities like Villanova, USC, and Penn are not state actors, 
and therefore not entitled to sovereign immunity protections.114  However, 
this creates another gap between athletic programs that would be covered by 
a ruling in favor of student-athletes against universities—only private 
schools would be covered by the court ruling.115  Even if student-athletes’ 
attempts to argue that the athletic departments of public universities are sep-
arate entities and private actors, athletic departments of public universities 
have generally been found to be state actors in the sovereign immunity con-
text as merely a part of the public university.116 
                                                          
113. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999).  See generally Wells v. Texas A&M Univ. 
Sys., No. 06-04-00001, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 8512 (Sept. 24, 2004), pet. denied, No. 04-1011, 
2005 Tex. LEXIS 81 (Tex. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 814 (2005) (finding that the Texas legis-
lature had not waived their sovereign immunity against FLSA claims, and that sovereign immunity 
applied to FLSA claims against public universities).  Alden has been applied within the collegiate 
athletics context in Cockrell v. Bd. Of Regents of N.M. State Univ., 132 N.M. 156 (2002) (finding 
that a college basketball coach could not recover overtime wages due to New Mexico State’s un-
waived constitutional immunity from FLSA suits) and Mehus v. Emporia State Univ., 295 F. Supp. 
2d 1258 (D. Kan. 2004) (holding the defendant university immune from the plaintiff women’s vol-
leyball coach’s claim that the university violated the Equal Pay Act in failing to provide similar pay 
and benefits to the male coaches, but allowing the plaintiff’s claims under Title IX to proceed).  
114. See, e.g., Scott, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2815 at *1 (finding that a private university’s 
police department was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment because 
private universities are not state actors); Leigh J. Jahnig, Under School Colors: Private University 
Police as State Actors under § 1983, NW. U. L. REV. 249, 282 (2015); see also Neal Ternes, Eve-
rywhere a Sign: ESPN College GameDay and the First Amendment, 17 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS 
L. 159, 162–63 (2016).  But see Univ. of the Incarnate Word v. Redus, 518 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tex. 
2017), remanded to No. 04-15-00120, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1702 (2018) (finding that a private 
university could be entitled to sovereign immunity protection, but only in regards to the operation 
of the university police department as allowed by the state legislature).  Scott and Univ. of the 
Incarnate Word represent the sole way in which private universities can possibly be considered 
state actors entitled to sovereign immunity protections: the operation of a state-sanctioned univer-
sity police force.  
115. See Complaint, Livers v. NCAA, No. 2:2017-CV-04271, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
83655 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2017) (filing against only private and semi-public universities within the 
Third Circuit’s purview, as “[t]he private and semi-public NCAA Division I member schools iden-
tified . . . have either not asserted, or not been granted, Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit under 
federal statutes in other litigation.”).  
116. See, e.g., Peirick v. Ind. Univ.–Purdue Univ. Indianapolis Athletics Dep’t, 510 F.3d 
681, 694 (7th Cir. 2007) (“At the outset, we note that the Athletics Department is not a legal entity 
apart from the University.  It is merely a division of the University that is not capable of being 
sued.”); Shriver v. Athletic Council of Kansas State Univ., 222 Kan. 216, 219 (1977) (“The Athletic 
Council is thus completely dominated by and is operated as an integral part of the University.  In 
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At the same time, it seems extremely unlikely that the NCAA would 
allow for such a gap to occur.  As much as the NCAA is clearly interested in 
not allowing for the payment of players, it would similarly be unwilling to 
allow for some schools to pay players while others cannot.  Such a decision 
would allow for serious competitive balance issues, as private schools would 
have an inherent recruiting advantage over public schools.  For example, if 
USC is required by law to pay their football players, while archrival Univer-
sity of California Los Angeles (“UCLA”) is not, recruits deciding between 
the two schools will likely be influenced heavily by the fact that USC can 
pay them beyond their athletic scholarship, while UCLA cannot.  Such a 
motivator seems like it would be antithetical to the NCAA’s goals in policing 
recruitment, and thus the NCAA will likely require all schools to pay stu-
dent-athletes the same amount. 
Furthermore, the public/private debate may be irrelevant if the NCAA 
is found to be liable as an employer under the FLSA.  The NCAA was dis-
missed as a defendant in Berger on standing grounds as having “too tenuous” 
a connection to the track-and-field student-athletes to constitute an employ-
ment relationship.117  The Livers Court, on the other hand, refused to adopt 
similar reasoning, stating that the joint employment relationship that Livers 
alleged existed between his school and the NCAA “must be evaluated in a 
                                                          
fulfilling the duties entrusted to it, and in its every activity and function, it is subject to the policy 
and control of the University.”)  This protection likely even applies when a public university creates 
a private corporation to manage its athletic departments, as some public schools—particularly those 
in the state of Florida—have done to avoid record disclosure laws.  See Deborah Strange, Public 
Nonprofits with Private Information Grow, THE GAINESVILLE SUN (May 29, 2018, 8:24 PM), 
http://www.gainesville.com/news/20180529/public-nonprofits-with-private-information-grow 
[https://perma.cc/QUR6-WCLH].  In a wrongful death suit involving a University of Central Flor-
ida football player who collapsed and died during conditioning drills, the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal of Florida wrote:  “[W]e find that UCFAA primarily acts as an instrumentality of UCF.  
While UCFAA is a private corporation, it is not an autonomous and self-sufficient entity.  Rather, 
UCF created UCFAA in order to take advantage of a privatized athletics program and to accept 
private donations on behalf of the university from donors who wish to remain anonymous.  UCFAA 
is wholly controlled by and intertwined with UCF, in that UCF created it, funded it and can dissolve 
it, in addition to oversee its day-to-day operations as much or as little as it sees fit.  UCFAA cer-
tainly does not possess the power or ability to shut UCF out of its decision-making completely.  
UCFAA’s sole function is to receive, hold, invest, and administer property and to make expendi-
tures to or for the benefit of UCF.  Namely, the purpose of UCFAA is to promote education and 
science and to encourage, stimulate, and promote the health and physical welfare of the students of 
UCF by encouraging, conducting, and maintaining all kinds of intercollegiate athletics, games, 
contests, meets, exhibits, and field sports at UCF and other places in the state.”  UCF Athletics 
Ass’n v. Plancher, 121 So. 3d 1097, 1109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).  
117. Berger, 843 F.3d at 289.  
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fact-intensive inquiry that is not ripe for determination on a motion to dis-
miss.”118  This is certainly by no means a finding that the NCAA is an em-
ployer of student-athletes, but it is an indication that the NCAA itself is not 
fully exempt from liability as of yet.  The NCAA would also not be able to 
claim sovereign immunity, even though it counts public schools among its 
ranks, thanks, ironically, to what might be its biggest judicial victory: the 
Supreme Court’s finding in NCAA v. Tarkanian that the NCAA is not a state 
actor.119 
Regardless, as controlling as Alden is on the principle that public 
schools would not be held to the same level of liability as private schools in 
the event of a Dawson or Livers victory, this potential unravelling effect on 
college athletics is unlikely to come to any practical fruition.  Even if the 
NCAA is not itself held liable as a joint employer of college athletes—which 
at this point is still something of a possibility—competitive balance and the 
NCAA’s desire to control recruiting will almost certainly rule the day and 
cause all student-athletes in any affected sports to receive FLSA protection. 
C. The FLSA and the Full-Time Student Exemption 
One final consideration in regard to the scope of a Livers or Dawson 
victory is in the various exemptions to the FLSA that serve to either fully 
exempt certain types of employees or employers from the FLSA,120 or give 
employers the ability to pay certain employees less than the minimum wage 
under certain circumstances.121  While none of the latter exceptions will 
                                                          
118. Livers v. NCAA, No. 17-4271, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124780, *23 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 
2018).  In Dawson, the District Court for the Northern District of California also did not dismiss 
the NCAA on standing like the Seventh Circuit did in Berger.  Furthermore, the Dawson court did 
not address joint employment at all in its decision, instead the court based its dismissal on its finding 
that Dawson was not an employee under the FLSA in general.  Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 404–
05.  
119. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 196 (1988) (“Just as a state-compensated public 
defender acts in a private capacity when he or she represents a private client in a conflict against 
the State . . . the NCAA is properly viewed as a private actor at odds with the State when it repre-
sents the interests of its entire membership in an investigation of one public university.”) (citation 
omitted).  
120. 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1938).  For example, the newly-created FLSA exemption for minor 
league baseball players.  See Sam C. Ehrlich, Minor Leagues, Major Effects: What if Senne Wins?, 
6 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 23, 23–24 (2016).  
121. 29 C.F.R. § 541 (2015); see also Wage & Hour Division, Fact Sheet #17A: Exemption 
for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Computer & Outside Sales Employees Under the Fair 
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likely apply to student-athletes,122 if student-athletes are deemed FLSA em-
ployees they will likely fit into the full-time student exemption, an exemp-
tion created for full-time students “employed in retail or service stores, agri-
culture, or colleges and universities.”123 
Per the Full-Time Student Exemption, eligible employers, including 
colleges and universities, can apply for and obtain a certificate from the DOL 
that allows the student to be paid “not less than 85% of the minimum 
wage.”124  However, in order to retain eligibility under this exemption, the 
students’ work is limited to eight hours per day and no more than twenty 
hours a week.125  Perhaps coincidentally, these restrictions line up exactly 
with the restrictions placed on Division I teams by the NCAA for in-season 
activities, with the limits dropping to eight hours per week during the offsea-
son for all sports except for football.126 
The NCAA and member schools, however, would still have to make 
major changes to reconcile with the DOL’s guidelines under the Full-Time 
Student Exemption for in-season hours.  According to the NCAA in-season 
                                                          
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Jan 2018), https://www.dol.gov/whd/over-
time/fs17a_overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/YFB5-3ZJH] [hereinafter “Fact Sheet #17A”].  
122. A case could be made—and presumably will be made by the NCAA if it gets that 
far—that college football teams are exempted from FLSA under the seasonal entertainment estab-
lishment exemption, which exempts employers who do not operate for more than seven months in 
any calendar year.  29 U.S.C. § 213 (1938); see also Bridewell v. Cincinnati Reds, 155 F.3d 828, 
832 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that a major league baseball team is not a season entertainment estab-
lishment in regards to the eligibility of stadium cleaning crew for FLSA protection because the 
team receives income during the offseason); see also Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, 64 F.3d 590, 
596 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding that a minor league baseball team is a season entertainment establish-
ment in regards to the eligibility of groundskeepers for FLSA protection because while the estab-
lishment is open year-round, it is only used by the defendant on a seasonal basis).  Intercollegiate 
football players likely fit more into Bridewell than Jeffery as while the length of the season (four-
five months) plus training camp (two months) is right around the seven-month cutoff point for this 
exemption, NCAA programs do still exert a substantial amount of control over student-athletes 
during the offseason, including over academics and training regimens.   
123. Wage and Hour Division, Questions and Answers About the Minimum Wage, U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/q-a.htm#full [perma.cc/6ZAE-TSJ3].  
124. Id.  
125. Id.  
126. Steve Berkowitz, Newly Proposed NCAA Rules Would Help Fix Time Loopholes for 
Student Athletes, USA TODAY (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/col-
lege/2016/11/02/ncaa-rules-student-athletes-time-academics/93164832/ [https://perma.cc/G7JN-
NAE8].  
EHRLICH_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2019  12:30 PM 
2019] THE FLSA AND THE NCAA’S POTENTIAL BAD DAY 107 
time restrictions, game day activities—including warmups, travel, meetings, 
and the game itself—count as a blanket three hours of “work,” and all travel 
days that include no athletic activities count as no time, and can even count 
as the one day off per week required during the season.127  Under the FLSA, 
however, travel time on special one day assignments in another city—which 
could include away games—counts as work time for the purposes of mini-
mum wage and overtime recordkeeping.128 
If the NCAA can even conceivably manage to engineer its time limita-
tions to fit the student-worker exemption, this rule would not fully exempt 
schools from having to pay student-athletes—it would merely function as a 
cost-cutting measure to avoid having to pay the full minimum wage.  Thus, 
if Dawson or Livers does lead to FLSA applicability to student-athletes, the 
NCAA damages and the potential effects of this new world of college ath-
letics.  The way to do this may be in a battle the NCAA previously fought—
collective bargaining. 
IV. FLSA, EMPLOYMENT, AND UNIONIZATION 
Of course, Dawson and Livers are not the first time that student-ath-
letes’ rights as potential employees have been debated on employment 
grounds.  While Dawson and Livers (and Berger) stand alone as the first 
challenges to the NCAA based on the FLSA, the NLRB has previously de-
bated whether student-athletes are employees of their schools in response to 
a petition filed by football players at Northwestern University who argued 
that they were employees under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) 
and thus deserve the right to unionize under federal labor law.129 
                                                          
127. Id.  
128. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946) (establishing the continu-
ous workday doctrine); Order Granting Stay Pending Appeal at *69–72, Senne v. Kansas City Roy-
als Baseball Corp., No. 14-cv-00608-JCS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69337 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2017); 
see also Wage and Hour Division, Fact Sheet #22: Hours Worked Under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (July 2008), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compli-
ance/whdfs22.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7WH-BYXT] [hereinafter “Fact Sheet #22”].  This particular 
issue has not yet been litigated for professional athletes (as most professional athletes make more 
than the minimum wage) but is a central issue in Senne on appeal at the Ninth Circuit, as the lower 
court’s use of the “continuous workday” rule in support of its conclusion that the players’ claims 
are addressable in a class wide basis is a central issue of MLB’s appeal.  
129. See Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n (CAPA), 362 N.L.R.B. 167 (N.L.R.B. 
Aug. 17, 2015).  
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At the inception of the Northwestern case, the Northwestern student-
athletes briefly won these rights after a regional board of the NLRB found in 
their favor in March 2014.130  Shortly thereafter, this decision was appealed 
to the entire NLRB who “punted” the case, declining to assert jurisdiction 
based on fears that its influence would destroy the “symbiotic relationship 
along the various teams, the conferences, and the NCAA” and create chaos 
in the labor relationship between student-athletes, schools, and the NCAA.131  
Still, the board noted that its decision to decline jurisdiction in the North-
western case “does not preclude a reconsideration of the [student-athlete em-
ployment] issue in the future” should circumstances change.132  The NLRB, 
however, has not yet taken another case to definitively decide the student-
athlete employment issue once and for all, despite a NLRB report issued by 
the NLRB general counsel referring to student-athletes’ relationship with 
their school as an employment relationship in other contexts.133 
As far as the courts in Dawson and Livers are concerned, the NLRB’s 
rulings on the issue having little bearing on student-athletes’ rights under the 
FLSA.134  In fact, in Dawson, the court specifically declined to adopt the 
2014 NLRB Regional Board’s decision that student-athletes are employees, 
both because the decision was not adopted by the NLRB and because the 
                                                          
130. Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n (CAPA), No. 13-RC-121359, 2014 NLRB 
LEXIS 221 (Mar. 26, 2014).  
131. See Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n (CAPA). 
132. Id. at 29.  See generally Todd A. Cherry, Declining Jurisdiction: Why Unionization 
Should Not be the Ultimate Goal for Collegiate Athletes, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1937 (2016).  
133. N.L.R.B. ADV. MEM. Case No. 13-CA-157467 (Sept. 22, 2016) (finding that North-
western’s social media policy for football student-athletes was unlawful under the NLRA while 
calling Northwestern “the Employer” and noting that even while noting that Northwestern is “still 
maintaining that athletic scholarship football players are not employees under the NLRA,” the uni-
versity still “modified the rules to bring them into compliance with the NLRA and sent the schol-
arship football players a notice of the corrections, which sets forth the rights of employees under 
the NLRA”); N.L.R.B. GEN. COUNS. MEM. GC 17-01, at 20 (Jan. 31, 2017) (“Accordingly, FBS 
scholarship football players clearly satisfy the broad Section 2(3) definition of employee and the 
common-law test.”); see Jake New, NLRB Chips Away at Athlete Amateurism, INSIDE HIGHER ED 
(Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/02/02/nlrb-general-counsel-says-pri-
vate-college-football-players-are-employees [http://perma.cc/VXH4-FLVZ].  See generally Roger 
M. Groves, Memorandum from Student-Athletes to Schools: My Social Media Posts Regarding My 
Coaches or My Causes are Protected Speech—How the NLRB is Restructuring Rights of Student-
Athletes in Private Institutions, 78 LA. L. REV. 71 (2018).  
134. Dawson v. NCAA, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 406 (N.D. Cal. 2017).  
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decision “involve[d] a different statute and different types of parties” than 
the Dawson case did.135 
The same, however, may not be true in reverse.  A finding in Dawson 
or Livers that student-athletes are employees could give the NLRB another 
opportunity to revisit the Northwestern issue.  The NLRB was clear in the 
Northwestern decision that its decision to decline jurisdiction in the employ-
ment dispute between Northwestern and their football team has no predictive 
value on “what the Board’s approach might be to a petition for all FBS schol-
arship football players (or at least those at private colleges and universi-
ties).”136  In fact, it is worth noting that the NLRA and the FLSA have the 
same scope in terms of which colleges and universities they affect.137  Just 
as this Article has established that a Dawson or Livers ruling in favor of stu-
dent-athlete employment rights under the FLSA would only apply to private 
colleges and universities, the NLRA does not apply to public employers like 
public colleges and universities.138  As such, a finding by the courts that pri-
vate school student-athletes are employees could trigger a renewed effort by 
                                                          
135. Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 406.  Oddly, the Dawson decision in this regard goes 
against Supreme Court precedent which has stated that the statutory definition of “employee” in 
the FLSA is significantly broader than definitions of “employee” in other statutes.  See United 
States v. Rossenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 n.3 (1945) (noting that then-Senator, and future Supreme 
Court justice, Hugo Black stated in Congress that the FLSA definition of employee is “the broadest 
definition that has ever been included in any one act”); see also Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 
331 U.S. 722, 728–29 (1947) (noting that the FLSA’s definition of “employ” is broad); see also 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (noting that the FLSA definition of 
employee “stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as 
such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles).  The First Circuit has noted the 
broad scope of the FLSA’s definition of employee in comparison to the NLRA, finding that the 
Congress later amended the NLRA to narrow the scope of its definition of an employee to “only 
persons acting as agents of an employer” in contrast to the significantly broader definition under 
the FLSA.  Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1512 (1st Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).  The 
NLRB’s propensity to call student-athletes “employees” under the NLRA—though the student-
athletes have not yet officially become employees—should be persuasive to the courts; in this re-
gard, the Dawson court’s reasoning seems out of line with prior precedent.  
136. Id.  
137. See supra Part III.B.  
138. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012).  Some states do allow their public college and university 
employees to unionize, but those rights are granted by state statute, not by the NLRA.  NLRB v. 
Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 704 n.17 (1980) (noting that “[a]lthough the NLRA is not applicable 
to any public employer,” as of 1976 “22 States had enacted legislation granting faculties at public 
institutions the right to unionize and requiring public employers to bargain with duly constituted 
bargaining agents”) (citation omitted).  
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student-athletes even beyond those at Northwestern to unionize and collec-
tively bargain employment terms with their schools and the NCAA. 
Obviously, the NCAA would likely adamantly oppose allowing stu-
dent-athletes to collectively bargain.  However, collective bargaining in col-
lege athletics may not be as big of a problem as some scholars have theo-
rized.139  In fact, collective bargaining may be a way for the NCAA to solve 
many of the problems introduced in this Article.  Collective bargaining could 
allow the NCAA to work with student-athletes directly to negotiate a system 
that fits with college athletics while still complying with the FLSA.140  This 
would allow the NCAA to work with the players to create rules in line with 
the minimum wage and overtime laws while affording itself protection from 
antitrust laws through the non-statutory labor exemption to protect against 
future antitrust lawsuits like In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Antitrust Litigation.141  
It has been noted that the purpose of the non-statutory labor exemption is to 
allow protection for both workers and employers in collective bargaining, 
which allows the two sides to come together and set terms and conditions of 
employment that fit the specific needs of their industry without worry of an-
titrust scrutiny.142 
Similarly, the NCAA could work with college athletes to design an em-
ployment scheme that best mirrors the positive attributes of the current am-
ateurism scheme in college sports while still allowing for the payment the 
student-athletes would be due under the FLSA.  The NCAA need not look 
                                                          
139. See, e.g., Cherry, supra note 132.  
140. Unlike antitrust laws under the non-statutory labor exemption, no collective bargain-
ing exemption exists for the FLSA; on the contrary, the Supreme Court has held on multiple occa-
sions that “FLSA rights cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived,” as allowing FLSA 
rights to be collectively bargained away “would ‘nullify the purposes’ of the statute and thwart the 
legislative policies it was designed to effectuate.”  Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 
728, 740 (1981); see also Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945) (“No one can 
doubt but that to allow waiver of statutory wages by agreement would nullify the purposes of the 
[FLSA].”); D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 116 (1946); Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 
Inc., 323 U. S. 37, 42 (1944); Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 577 
(1942).  
141. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (finding that col-
lectively bargained employment terms were exempt from antitrust laws and thus creating the non-
statutory labor exemption).  See also, e.g., Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 
1976); Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996); Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2nd Cir. 
2004) (applying the non-statutory labor exemption within the context of professional sports); Ethan 
Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 DUKE L.J. 339 (1989).  
142. See, e.g., Kieran M. Corcoran, When Does the Buzzer Sound?:  The Nonstatutory La-
bor Exemption in Professional Sports, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1045, 1053 (1994).  
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far for an example of how this may work, as collective bargaining already 
exists within the student-employment framework with graduate assistants for 
doctoral students.143  In a typical graduate assistant collective bargaining 
agreement, graduate assistants are afforded stipends and tuition waivers in 
exchange for hours worked as course instructors, teaching or research assis-
tants, office assistants, or other assigned tasks.144  However, to receive their 
stipend and tuition waiver, graduate assistants are required to retain a certain 
credit load and meet exact requirements of their academic program.145  While 
the graduate assistants’ stipends are typically below minimum wage, this is 
allowed due to the student worker exemption of the FLSA.146  In this regard, 
graduate assistants still have their academic progress prioritized, but are 
given the compensation they deserve under federal and state laws.  Such a 
model might be optimal for the NCAA, should student-athletes gain com-
pensation or employment rights under the FLSA or through antitrust law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As this Article established, student-athletes have several major hurdles 
to clear before they can be deemed employees under the FLSA.  Indeed, 
                                                          
143. See Gordon J. Heweitt, Graduate Student Employee Collective Bargaining and the 
Educational Relationship Between Faculty and Graduate Students, 29 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTS. 
153, 154 (2000); see also Grant M. Hayden, The University Works Because We Do:  Collective 
Bargaining Rights for Graduate Assistants, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2000) (noting that 
graduate assistants at many schools have had collective bargaining rights since the 1970s).  Grad-
uate assistants were recently found to be employees under the NLRA in December 2017, reversing 
a prior decision that found otherwise.  Trs. of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y. & Graduate 
Workers of Columbia-GWU, No. 02-RC-143012, 2017 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 620, *3 (Dec. 16, 2017) 
(certifying a union of graduate assistants at Columbia University); Brown Univ. & Int’l Union, 342 
N.L.R.B. 483, 488-91 (2004) (finding that the primary relationship of graduate assistants to their 
purported employer was educational, not economic, and thereby declining to certify a union of 
these graduate assistants); Lucas Novaes, It’s Time to Stop Punting on College Athletes’ Rights: 
Implications of Columbia University on the Collective Bargaining Rights of College Athletes, 66 
AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1533, 1536 (2017) (examining the implications of the Colum. Univ. decision 
on college athletes’ efforts to unionize).  
144. See, e.g., Collective Bargaining Agreement, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY & UNITED 
FACULTY OF FLORIDA FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE ASSISTANTS UNITED 1, 10, 28, 
43 (Sept. 10, 2015), http://hr.fsu.edu/pdf/2015-2018FSU-BOT_GAU_CBA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QM8S-HZJ7].  
145. Id. at 28.  
146. Wage and Hour Division, supra note 128; see supra Part III.C.  
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given the procedural issues facing both Dawson and Livers in their respec-
tive claims,147 it is likely that any successful challenge to NCAA amateurism 
rules will come from a different case down the road.  However, given the 
leniency that the Livers court has given Livers’s claim148 and the roadmap 
provided in that court’s order to dismiss with leave to amend, the NCAA 
should prepare for the possibility that a court could rule that student-athletes 
have rights as employees under the FLSA, even if that possibility is narrow 
and a long way away. 
Moving forward, the NCAA is at a crossroads.  It can continue to fight 
these claims—along with the antitrust cases149—and even look to the exam-
ple set by MLB and lobby Congress for an amendment to the FLSA that 
specifically exempts student-athletes from FLSA protection even if deemed 
employees under that statute’s broad definition.150  Given how staunchly the 
NCAA has defended amateurism to date, this seems the most likely scenario.  
However, the NCAA can also be proactive in creating a new amateurism 
model based on the example set with graduate assistantships, where student-
athletes are afforded protections under the FLSA and collective bargaining 
rights while still being held to educational commitments as students of their 
respective universities.151 
The NCAA will likely fight any comparison between student-athletes 
and graduate assistants with all of its might.  As this Article establishes, how-
ever, if it does not take the looming threat of the FLSA seriously, a court 
decision in this regard against it could be far more damaging than any anti-
trust action could ever be in the sheer logistic and competitive balance mess 
that granting student-athletes FLSA employment status could create.  Proac-
tive action can allow the NCAA to get ahead of this issue, and proactive 
action that allows student-athletes to help set the terms of employment along-
side the NCAA and their schools could help the NCAA get past the student-
                                                          
147. See supra Part II.C.  
148. See Livers v. NCAA, No. 17-4271, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83655 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 
2018); see supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text.  
149. See In re NCAA Ath. Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., supra note 6. 
150.  See generally Nathaniel Grow, The Save America’s Pastime Act: Special-Interest 
Legislation Epitomized, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3169957 [http://perma.cc/BE27-7YDF].  See Ehrlich, supra note 10.  
151. See generally Lucas Novaes, It’s Time to Stop Punting on College Athletes’ Rights: 
Implications of Columbia University on the Collective Bargaining Rights of College Athletes, 66 
AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1533 (2017); see supra Part IV. 
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compensation for good, while granting student-athletes the rights they may 
well deserve under federal law. 
 
